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Session Title: Happiness, Income and Welfare
In the face of evidence that individuals
may lack coherent and/or stable preferences,
is there a case for using happiness data
to underpin economic policy?
Typically, large scale survey (panel) data
on individual’s self-reported subjective well-being (SWB)
is regressed on a number of independent variables of interest.
A number of such studies have provided evidence
that well-being self-reports are correlated
with objective measures such as health measures.
However, the use of such data on its own
as a normative underpinning for policy raises a number of concerns
that will be addressed in this session.
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Four Income Distributions
Income Data
Accessible data source: World Values Survey (WVS),
five waves between 1981 and 2007,
total of 117,876 observations.
Yearly Individual Income measured in year 2000 US dollars:
extract the lower and upper bounds of the income range
reported by the interviewee;
transform it to annual income;
use an interval regression to estimate a probability distribution
of possible incomes for each interviewee;
use data from World Development Indicators (WDI) 2010
to correct for exchange rates and price changes.
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Four Income Distributions
Income Distribution: Blue
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Four Income Distributions
Income Distribution: Green
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Four Income Distributions
Income Distribution: Comparing Blue and Green
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Four Income Distributions
Income Distribution: Yellow
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Four Income Distributions
Income Distribution: Red
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Four Income Distributions
Four Income Distributions Together
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Dominance
Income Correlates
What are these colours that lie behind
these (stochastically dominating) rightward shifts
in the conditional income distribution?
The World Values Survey also has people report
a level of happiness:
1 blue for “not at all happy” (2.55%);
2 green for “not very happy” (15.16%);
3 yellow for “quite happy” (53.94%);
4 red for “very happy” (28.35%).
Income distribution conditional on a higher happiness level
stochastically dominates
income distribution conditional on a lower happiness level.
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Dominance
National GDP
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Psychological Precursors
Watson, Goodwin (1930)
“Happiness Among Adult Students of Education”
Journal of Educational Psychology 21: 79–109.
Wilson, Warner R. (1967) “Correlates of Avowed Happiness”
Psychological Bulletin 67: 294–306.
Diener, Ed (1984) “Subjective Well-Being”
Psychological Bulletin 95: 542–575.
Diener, Ed, Eunkook Suh, Richard Lucas, and Heidi Smith (1999)
“Subjective Well-Being: Three Decades of Progress”
Psychological Bulletin, 125: 276–302.
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Easterlin paradox
Easterlin, Richard A. (1974) “Does Economic Growth
Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence”
in Paul A. David and Melvin W. Reder (eds.)
Nations and Households in Economic Growth:
Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz (New York: Academic Press)
Study of the US during the period between 1946 and 1970.
Economic growth appeared not to have enhanced SWB.
Though US income per person rose steadily,
average reported happiness showed no long-term trend,
and actually declined between 1960 and 1970.
Contrast between the views of two late Stanford colleagues:
Moses Abramovitz, historian of economic growth
Tibor Scitovsky, The Joyless Economy
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Easterlin paradox: Is it relevant?
Within a given country, people with higher incomes
are more likely to report being happy.
The joint worldwide distribution indicates
that happiness and income are also positively associated,
suggesting that Easterlin’s findings have limited extent.
But the average reported level of happiness within a country
varies much less w.r.t. national income per person,
at least for countries with income sufficient to meet basic needs.
The happiness reports indicate something statistically significant.
But we can still dispute what is the significance.
Or even the hypothesis that income causes happiness,
as opposed to happiness causing income.
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Welfare
First Normative Extreme: “(Neo-)classicism”
Abramovitz(?): Social choice theory and welfare economics
should ignore SWB measures altogether,
treating them as mere noise.
Two claims:
Positive Income growth and wealth accumulation
are inherently desirable.
Strong Negative Empirical analysis of SWB
has no normative significance.
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Welfare
Kuznets’ Scepticism
Simon Kuznets, whom President Hoover had commissioned
to conduct the surveys needed to measure national income,
and eventually won a Nobel Prize in Economics for his work,
reported in 1934 that: “The welfare of a nation
can scarcely be inferred from a measure of national income.”
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Welfare
Second Normative Extreme: “Hedonism”
Scitovsky(?): Some propose welfare measures
based exclusively on SWB.
A BBC survey in 2006 concluded that 81% of Britain’s population
would rather the government make them happier than richer.
Under this approach, Easterlin’s paradox might suggest
we should not even try to promote growth or development.
Francis Ysidro Edgeworth (1881) Mathematical Psychics:
An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences
Possibilities for compromise will be explored.
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Welfare
Layard, Mayraz, and Nickell: Descriptive Hypothesis
Layard, Richard, Guy Mayraz, and Stephen Nickell (2008)
“The Marginal Utility of Income”
Journal of Public Economics 92: 1846–1857.
They estimate the equation h = u(y) + b>x +  with E = 0.
Here h is SWB, y is income, and x is a vector
of other observable individual characteristics
that may be relevant to both:
1 individuals’ reports of their own SWB;
2 social value judgements of individual welfare.
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Welfare
Psychological Inequality Aversion
Moreover, they take d ln u/d ln y = −a,
where the parameter a is the the Atkinson measure
of (constant) relative inequality aversion.
To be compared with the Arrow–Pratt measure
of relative risk aversion.
They call u′(y) = y−a the “marginal utility” of income,
though it is merely marginal happiness
or, at best, psychological marginal utility.
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Welfare
Layard, Mayraz, Nickell: Prescriptive Hypothesis
The function u′(y) = y−a need not be the same
as the ethical marginal utility of income
which is important for cost–benefit analysis and optimal taxation.
For it to be so involves
an extra “Benthamite” prescriptive hypothesis.
Given an income distribution yN and a profile xN
of other observable individual characteristics relevant to welfare,
it is assumed that social welfare can be measured by the sum
W (yN , xN) ≡
∑
i∈N E[hi |yi , xi ] ≡
∑
i∈N [u(yi ) + b
>xi ]
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Additive Utilitarianism
Individuals and Consequences
Consider a society made up of a finite set N of individuals.
Consequences are individualized social states zN ∈ ZN :=∏i∈N Zi ,
where each zi ∈ Zi is a personal consequence for individual i .
A social consequence lottery λ ∈ ∆(ZN) is a finitely supported
probability distribution on the consequence space.
For each i ∈ N and λ ∈ ∆(ZN),
let λi ∈ ∆(Zi ) denote the induced marginal distribution
on i ’s personal consequences.
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Additive Utilitarianism
Decisions and NM Utilities
Two von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions
(or NMUFs) w , w˜ : ZN → R are cardinally equivalent
just in case there exist an additive constant α
and a multiplicative constant ρ > 0
such that w˜(zN) ≡ α + ρw(zN).
Rationality of normative behaviour in ethical decision trees
implies there exists a unique cardinal equivalence class of NMUFs
ZN 3 zN 7→ w(zN) ∈ R
whose expected values Eλ[w(zN)]
are all maximized simultaneously w.r.t. λ.
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Additive Utilitarianism
Individualistic Consequentialism
Assumption
If the two social consequence lotteries λ, µ ∈ ∆(ZN) induce
equal marginal personal lotteries λi = µi ∈ ∆(Zi ) for all i ∈ N,
then λ and µ are socially equivalent.
In particular, they are socially indifferent,
so the respective expected values of the social NMUF w
must satisfy Eλw(zN) = Eµw(zN).
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Additive Utilitarianism
Individual Welfarism
Assumption
For each individual i ∈ N,
there is a unique cardinal equivalence class
of personal NMUFs zi 7→ wi (zi ) which,
for each fixed profile z¯N\{i} ∈∏j∈N\{i} Zj
of personal consequences zj ∈ Zj for individuals j 6= i ,
are all cardinally equivalent to zi 7→ w(zi , z¯N\{i}).
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Additive Utilitarianism
Additive Utilitarianism
Definition: Two families 〈wi 〉i∈N , 〈w˜i 〉i∈N of personal NMUFs
are co-cardinally equivalent just in case
there exist a family 〈αi 〉i∈N of additive constants
and a single multiplicative constant ρ > 0, independent of i ,
such that w˜i (z
N) ≡ αi + ρwi (zN).
Theorem: Together, individualistic consequentialism
and individual welfarism imply that, except in trivial cases,
there exists a unique co-cardinal equivalence class
of interpersonally comparable NMUFs N × Z 3 (i , z) 7→ wi (z) ∈ R
such that the social NMUF zN 7→ w(zN)
can be written in the additive utilitarian form
zN 7→ w(zN) =
∑
i∈N wi (zi ).
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Additive Utilitarianism
Individual Welfare Types
Assumption: Each individual i ∈ N also has a fixed type ti ∈ T .
Let tN ∈ TN :=∏i∈N Ti denote the fixed “welfare” type profile.
This type profile tN , together with a “master” utility function
Z × T 3 (z , t) 7→ v(z ; t)
satisfying wi (zi ) ≡ v(zi ; ti ) for all i ∈ N and zi ∈ Z ,
is assumed to determine the co-cardinal equivalence class
N × Z × TN 3 (i , z , tN) 7→ v(z ; ti ),
and so the social NMUF
zN 7→ w(zN ; tN) =
∑
i∈N v(zi ; ti ).
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Binomial Choice and Ordinal Welfare
Binomial Choice Model
Suppose SWB is measured by a binary variable s ∈ {0, 1}, where:
s = 1 indicates general life satisfaction;
s = 0 indicates general life dissatisfaction.
Assume we can observe the function
Z × T 3 (z , t) 7→ p(z , t) ∈ [0, 1]
whose value is the proportion of type t individuals
who face personal consequence z ∈ Z and report s = 1.
This makes p(z , t) more informative than s itself.
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Binomial Choice and Ordinal Welfare
Ordinal Non-Comparable Welfare
In the Arrow (1951) ordinal non-comparable (ONC) case,
one could make the ethical value judgement that
for each fixed type t ∈ T ,
the two functions z 7→ p(z , t) and z 7→ v(z ; t)
are ordinally equivalent on Z .
For each separate type t ∈ T , there must be a strictly increasing
transformation R 3 ξ 7→ ψt(ξ) ∈ R such that v(z ; t) = ψt(p(z , t)).
It follows that the additive NMUF takes the form
w(zN ; tN) =
∑
i∈N ψti (p(zi , ti ))
From now on, let Ψ denote the class
of all transformations ψ : T × R→ R
with the property that ξ 7→ ψt(ξ)
is strictly increasing for each welfare type t ∈ T .
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Binomial Choice and Ordinal Welfare
Ordinal Level Comparable Welfare
In the ordinal level comparable (OLC) case,
one could make the ethical value judgement that
the two functions (z , t) 7→ p(z , t) and (z , t) 7→ v(z ; t)
are ordinally equivalent on Z × T , even as the type t ∈ T varies.
There must be just one strictly increasing transformation
R 3 ξ 7→ φ(ξ) ∈ R such that v(z ; t) = φ(p(z , t)).
It follows that the additive NMUF takes the form
w(zN ; tN) =
∑
i∈N φ(p(z , ti ))
From now on, let Φ denote the class
of all strictly increasing transformations φ : R→ R.
ESRC Research Methods Festival St. Caths, Oxford, 2012 July 5th 33/ 55
Introduction Precursors Social Choice Binary SWB General SWB Conclusions
Dominance Conditions
Pareto Dominance
Proposition Consider any fixed type profile tN ∈ TN .
Suppose that zN , z˜N ∈ ZN .
The following two statements are equivalent:
ISP (independent strict preference)∑
i∈N ψti (p(zi , ti )) >
∑
i∈N ψti (p(z˜i , ti ))
for all ψ ∈ Ψ simultaneously;
PD (Pareto dominance) p(zi , ti ) ≥ p(z˜i , ti ) for all i ∈ N,
with strict inequality for at least one i ∈ N.
Corollary Without more information about (z , t) 7→ v(z ; t),
given any feasible alternative set A ⊂ ZN and any zN ∈ A:
1 zN is a possible social choice iff it is Pareto efficient;
2 zN is an impossible social choice iff it is Pareto dominated.
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Dominance Conditions
Suppes Dominance, I
Definition Given any fixed type profile tN ∈ TN ,
and any social consequence zN ∈ ZN ,
define the associated interpersonal cumulative distribution function
[0, 1] 3 ξ 7→ G (ξ; tN , zN) ∈ [0, 1]
so that G (ξ; tN , zN) is the expected proportion of individuals
whose personal consequence zi induces a probability p(zi , ti )
of expressing satisfaction that does not exceed ξ.
Note that a lower value of G for each ξ
suggests an improvement in (tN , zN).
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Dominance Conditions
Suppes Dominance, II
Following Suppes (1966), given any welfare type profile tN ∈ TN
and any fixed pair of social consequences zN , z˜N ∈ ZN ,
say that zN Suppes dominates z˜N , and write zN SD
tN
z˜N ,
just in case the respective induced interpersonal CDFs satisfy:
1 G (ξ; tN , zN) ≤ G (ξ; tN , z˜N) for all ξ ∈ [0, 1];
2 G (ξ; tN , zN) < G (ξ; tN , z˜N) for at least one ξ ∈ [0, 1].
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Dominance Conditions
Suppes Dominance III
Proposition Consider any fixed type profile tN ∈ TN .
For any zN , z˜N ∈ ZN , the following two statements are equivalent:
ISP (independent strict preference)∑
i∈N φ(p(zi , ti )) >
∑
i∈N φ(p(z˜i , ti ))
for all φ ∈ Φ simultaneously;
SD (Suppes dominance) zN SD
tN
z˜N .
Corollary Given any feasible set A ⊂ ZN and any zN ∈ A,
without more information about the function (z , t) 7→ v(z ; t):
1 zN is a possible social choice iff it is Suppes undominated;
2 zN is an impossible social choice iff it is Suppes dominated.
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Ordered Multinomial Choice
The Ordered Multinomial Choice Model
Suppose now that SWB ranges over the set S := {0, 1, 2, . . . , `}.
The previous binary case had ` = 1.
For each s ∈ S , let p(s|z , t) denote the conditional probability
that an individual of type t ∈ T facing personal consequence z ∈ Z
reports an SWB level s.
Consider the downwardly cumulated conditional probabilities
P(s|z , t) :=
∑`
s′=s
p(s ′|z , t)
that the individual reports an SWB level no lower than s.
Of course, in the binomial case when ` = 1,
one has P(0|z , t) = 1 and P(1|z , t) = p(z , t).
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Ordered Multinomial Choice
Stochastic Utility
Definition: For each type t ∈ T , the mapping Z 3 z 7→ ut(z)
is a stochastic utility function if there exist both:
a strictly increasing and continuous CDF R 3 ξ 7→ Ht(ξ)
whose range includes (0, 1);
a strictly increasing sequence of constants (ξst )
`
s=1;
with the property that P(s|z , t) = Ht(ut(z)− ξst )
for all SWB levels s ∈ S \ {0} and all consequences z ∈ Z .
It is conceptually entirely distinct from the random utility model:
for each non-empty feasible subset F ⊆ Z , that model specifies
the probability p(z ,F ) that an individual will choose each z ∈ F
as equal to the probability that the random utility function
gives z no less utility than the other members of F .
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Ordered Multinomial Choice
Stochastic Utility
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Ordered Multinomial Choice
Ordered Logit and Probit
The interpersonally comparable stochastic
utility function (z , t) 7→ P(s|z , t) = Ht(ut(z)− ξst )
is consistent with standard ordered discrete choice models such as:
ordered logit, where ln[P/(1− P)] = βtU,
implying that P = H(U) = eβtU/(1 + eβtU);
ordered probit, where P = Ht(U) = Φ((U − µt)/σt)
for the standard normal CDF Φ(U) := 1√
2pi
∫ U
−∞ e
− 1
2
v2dv .
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Ordered Multinomial Choice
Stochastic Utility and Welfare
Proposition: If type t has a stochastic utility function z 7→ ut(z),
then for all s ∈ S it is ordinally equivalent to z 7→ P(s|z , t).
Proof: Suppose that P(s|z , t) = Ht(ut(z)− ξst ),
where Ht is strictly increasing. Then
P(s|z , t) T P(s|z ′, t) ⇐⇒ Ht(ut(z)− ξst ) T Ht(ut(z ′)− ξst )
⇐⇒ ut(z) T ut(z ′)
By definition, therefore, for all s ∈ S ,
the two mappings z 7→ P(s|z , t) and z 7→ ut(z)
must be ordinally equivalent. QED
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Ordered Multinomial Choice
Ordinal Non-Comparable Welfare
In the ordinal non-comparable (ONC) case,
one can judge that for each fixed type t ∈ T ,
the two functions z 7→ ut(z) and z 7→ v(z ; t)
are ordinally equivalent on Z .
Provided ordinal equivalence holds, for each type t ∈ T and s ∈ S ,
there must be a strictly increasing transformation ξ 7→ ψst (ξ) on R
such that v(z ; t) = ψst (P(s|z , t)).
It follows that the additive NMUF takes the form
w(zN ; tN) =
∑
i∈N ψ
s
ti
(uti (zi ))
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Ordered Multinomial Choice
Interpersonally Comparable Stochastic Utility
Definition: The mapping Z × T 3 (z , t) 7→ ut(z)
is an interpersonally comparable stochastic utility function
if there exist both:
a strictly increasing and continuous CDF R 3 ξ 7→ H(ξ)
whose range includes (0, 1);
a strictly increasing sequence of constants (ξst )
`
s=1;
with the property that P(s|z , t) = H(ut(z)− ξs)
for all types t ∈ T , SWB levels s ∈ S \ {0},
and personal consequences z ∈ Z .
Proposition: If there is an interpersonally comparable
stochastic utility function (z , t) 7→ ut(z),
then it is ordinally equivalent, for all s ∈ S , to (z , t) 7→ P(s|z , t).
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Ordered Multinomial Choice
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Ordered Multinomial Choice
Ordinal Level Comparable Welfare
In the ordinal level comparable (OLC) case,
one could judge that even as the type t ∈ T varies,
the two functions (z , t) 7→ P(s|z , t) and (z , t) 7→ v(z ; t)
are ordinally equivalent on Z × T .
It follows that the additive NMUF takes the form
w(zN ; tN) =
∑
i∈N φ(uti (zi ))
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Dominance Conditions
Pareto Dominance
Proposition Consider any fixed type profile tN ∈ TN .
Suppose that zN , z˜N ∈ ZN .
The following two statements are equivalent:
ISP (independent strict preference)∑
i∈N ψ
s
ti
(uti (zi )) >
∑
i∈N ψ
s
ti
(uti (z˜i ))
for all s ∈ S and ψs ∈ Ψ simultaneously;
PD (Pareto dominance) for all s ∈ S simultaneously,
one has P(s|zi , ti ) ≥ P(s|z˜i , ti ) for all i ∈ N,
with P(s|zi , ti ) > P(s|z˜i , ti ) for at least one i ∈ N.
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Dominance Conditions
Interpersonal CDF
Definition: Given any fixed type profile tN ∈ TN ,
any SWB level s ∈ S , and any social consequence zN ∈ ZN ,
define the associated interpersonal cumulative distribution function
[0, 1] 3 ξ 7→ G s(ξ; tN , zN) ∈ [0, 1]
so that G s(ξ; tN , zN) is the expected proportion of individuals
whose personal consequence zi induces a probability P(s|zi , ti )
no higher than ξ of expressing an SWB level ≥ s.
Recall that a lower value of G for each ξ
suggests an improvement in (tN , zN).
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Dominance Conditions
Suppes Dominance Revisited
Proposition: Consider any fixed type profile tN ∈ TN .
For any zN , z˜N ∈ ZN , the following two statements are equivalent:
ISP (independent strict preference)∑
i∈N φ(uti (zi )) >
∑
i∈N φ(uti (z˜i ))
for all s ∈ S and φ ∈ Φ simultaneously;
SD (Suppes dominance) For all s ∈ S simultaneously,
one has G s(ξ; tN , zN) ≤ G s(ξ; tN , z˜N) for all ξ ∈ [0, 1],
with G s(ξ; tN , zN) < G s(ξ; tN , z˜N) for at least one ξ ∈ [0, 1].
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Dominance Conditions
Layard, Mayraz and Nickell
LMN’s regression equation s = u(y) + b>x + 
can be recast as an interpersonally comparable stochastic utility
function (z , t) 7→ P(s|z , t) = H(ut(z)− ξs), with CDF  7→ H(),
and with ut(z)− ξs replaced by u(y) + b>x− s, independent of t.
This allows empirical data to determine the form
of the psychological marginal utility function y 7→ u′(y)
and so of the stochastic utility function (y , x) 7→ u(y) + b>x.
One can also test whether u′(y) is indeed independent of x.
LMN’s regressions cannot, however, determine the form
of the ethical NMUF (y , x) 7→ v(y , x)
beyond some increasing transformation φ(u(y) + b>x)
of the empirically determined stochastic utility function.
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Welfare Weights and Inequality Aversion
Psychological facts concerning SWB measures
cannot by themselves determine:
1 welfare weights which tell us how to trade off
some individuals’ welfare gains against others’ losses;
2 inequality aversion concerning the elasticity
of the marginal rate of substitution
between different individuals’ incomes.
These both require much stronger ethical value judgements,
giving the probabilities P(s|z , t) (questionable)
cardinal significance as welfare indicators.
This is implicitly what Layard, Mayraz and Nickell in particular do.
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Arrow’s Questions
1951 Is there a satisfactory voting procedure
for aggregating individual values
into a “rational” social objective?
2012 What has this talk to do with the Easterlin paradox?
Perhaps more income does increase SWB.
Perhaps, however, the “paradox” arises
because individuals adapt to higher income levels,
and expect continued growth.
The static theory discussed here says nothing about this.
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Robert F. Kennedy
Address, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, March 18, 1968:
“Too much and too long, we seem to have surrendered community
excellence and community values in the mere accumulation of
material things. Our gross national product . . . if we should judge
America by that — counts air pollution and cigarette advertising,
and ambulances to clear our highways of carnage. It counts special
locks for our doors and the jails for those who break them. It
counts the destruction of our redwoods and the loss of our natural
wonder in chaotic sprawl. It counts napalm and the cost of a
nuclear warhead, and armored cars for police who fight riots in our
streets. It counts Whitman’s rifle and Speck’s knife, and the
television programs which glorify violence in order to sell toys to
our children.”
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Robert F. Kennedy, continued
“Yet the gross national product does not allow for the health of
our children, the quality of their education, or the joy of their play.
It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our
marriages; the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of
our public officials. It measures neither our wit nor our courage;
neither our wisdom nor our learning; neither our compassion nor
our devotion to our country; it measures everything, in short,
except that which makes life worthwhile. And it tells us everything
about America except why we are proud that we are Americans.”
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Thomas Jefferson, following George Mason
4th July 1776: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and
the pursuit of Happiness.”
We should provide people, not with happiness,
but with the opportunity to pursue happiness.
Relationship with Amartya Sen’s work on individual capabilities?
But not just aggregate happiness.
Much work to do.
Many thanks for coming along!
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